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Nothing more exposes a physician's true ethics than the way he or 
she balances his or her own interests against those of the patient. 1 
A 1987 New York Times editorial noted that the refusal of phy-
sicians and dentists to treat patients infected with the AIDS virus2 is 
the most painful symptom produced by the fear of AIDS. 3 An editorial 
in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) echoed 
this concern. 4 C. Everett Koop, the Surgeon General of the United 
States, admitted that he is getting more reports of health care providers 
refusing to treat people infected with the AIDS virus. 5 In November, 
1987, the American Medical Association, a national voluntary as so-
*Professor of Law, University of Tulsa; Former Chairperson of the Law & Ethics 
Committee of the Oklahoma Governor's AIDS Task Force. Contributing author to 
AIDS f..ND THE LAW: A GmnE FOR THE PUBLIC (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987). B.A., 
Syracuse University, 1965; J.D., Howard University, 1968. 
'Pellegrino, Altruism, Self-Interest, and Medical Ethics, 258 JAMA 1939 (1987). 
2AIDS stands for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. AIDS is believed to be 
caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). ARC stands for Aids Related 
Complex. · 
3When Doctors Refuse to Treat AIDS, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1987, at A16, col. 1 (late 
ed:). See, e.g., Refusal to Treat AIDS Infant Sparks Debate, Tulsa World, Jan 18, 1988, at 
A5,col. 1 (Firefighters in Annapolis, California refused to help an infant with AIDS 
who appeared to be choking, claiming that no one present was trained in emergency 
care for persons with AIDS); Surgeon Won't Operate on Victims of AIDS, N.Y. Times, 
March 13, 1987, at A21, col. 4 (late ed.); Doctor Bars AIDS Patients, Tulsa World, Oct. 
22, 1987, at 02, col. 5 (Surgeons ~n Milwaukee and Mountain View, California have 
refused to operate on persons infected with AIDS),. 
•see generally Pellegrino, supra note 1. 
5Boffey, Doctors Who Shun AIDS Patients Are Assailed by Surgeon General, N.Y. Times, 
Sept: 10,1987, at A1, col. 4 (late ed.). Koop also said that some health care providers 
are refusing to treat persons suspected of having AIDS. ld. 
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ciation of physicians, declared that physicians have an ethical duty to 
treat people infected with the AIDS virus. 6 Shortly thereafter, the 
Texas Medical Association and the Arizona State Board of Medical 
Examiners adopted policies which said that physicians can refuse to 
treat persons infected with the AIDS virus as long as they refer the 
patients to other physicians. 7 
Both Surgeon General Koop and the American Medical Associ-
ation believe that only a small number of physicians are refusing to 
treat persons with AIDS. 8 Health care providers also refuse to treat · 
patients with other diseases. 9 Nevertheless, current cases have stim-
ulated discussion within the medical community about the legal, eth-
ical, and moral obligations of physicians toward people in need of 
medical care. 10 These questions are not new and there are few clear-
cut answers. 
As the number of persons with AIDS increases, 11 new trends 
emerge. Since 1981, most adults in the United States infected with 
AIDS have been homosexual or bisexual men without a history of 
intravenous (IV) drug abuse. 12 However, a second group of infected 
persons, which includes intravenous drug users, their sexual partners 
and offspring, has emerged. 13 This group of patients, unlike the initial 
6Pear, A.M.A. Rules That Doctors Are Obligated To Treat AIDS, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 
1987, at A14, col. 1 (late ed. ). The A.M.A.'s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
Report states:" A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition 
is within the physician's current realm of competence solely because the patient is 
seropositive [to the AIDS antibody}." A.M.A. CouNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JuDICIAL 
AFFAJRS, ETHICAL IssuEs INVOLVED IN THE GRoWING AIDS CRISIS (Dec. 1987) [here-
inafter AIDS REPORT] reprinted in Freedman, Health Professions, Codes, and the Right to 
Refuse to Treat HIV-!Hfectimts Patimts, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 20, 
24 (SpecialSupp.). 
7TMA Policy Lets lv!Ds refuse AIDS Patients If They Refer, Amer. Med. News, Dec. 4, 
1987, at 3, col. 4; Ariz.lv!Ds Ca11 Refuse AIDS Patients, Amer. Med. News, Nov. 6, 1987, 
at 37, coL 2. 
'Boffey, supra note 5; Pear, supra note 6. 
'Sec, e.g., 9 Fla. Hospitals Refuse Emergwcy Victim, Am. Med. News, Oct. 16, 1987, 
at 31, coL 1 (physicians reluctant to accept trauma cases, such as critically injured 
gunshot victim, because of skyrocketing insurance premiums). 
10Zuger & Miles, Physicialls, AIDS, allLt Occupational Risk: Historic TI·aditions and Eth-
ical Obligatiolls, 258 ]AMA 1924 (1987). 
11 Curran, Jaffe, Hardy, Morgan, Selik, and Dondero, Epidemiology of HIV Infection 
and AIDS in the Lhzited States, 239 SCIENCE 610 (1988) (By the end of 1987, 49,793 cases 
of AIDS had been reported in the United States). 
121d. at 610. This group represents 65% of the total reported cases. Id. 
13Id. Intravenous drug users account for 17% of all reported AIDS cases. Seventy 
percent of the 2.3% heterosexual transmission cases involved sexual partners of IV 
drug users, and 70% of peri natally acquired AIDS cases are related to lV drug abuse 
by the child's mother or her sexual partner. Id. at 610-11. 
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group of middle class gay and bisexual men, are primarily black and 
Hispanic. 14 They are generally indigent, have little or no health insur-
ance, and have traditionally been denied access to adequate health 
care. 15 If a small number of physicians are refusing to treat infected 
persons who can pay and are responsive to medical counselling, then 
it is foreseeable that an even larger number of physicians will refuse 
to treat minority individuals who are not able to pay and who may be 
more resistant to medical counselling. Within the next five years there 
is a real possibility that hundreds of thousands of people infected with 
HIV will have severely limited access to health care. 16 
This article examines both the legal and ethical duty of physi-
cians to treat persons in need of medical care. It also reviews the 
arguments for and against recognition of any right to health care. 
These issues will be examined to det~rmine if either the legislature or 
the courts need to modify current law in this area in light of the AIDS 
epidemic. 
Legal Duty to Treat 
Creating a Duty 
Early English law treated physicians like other business persons 
offering services to the public. 17 This view changed over time and the 
relationship between physician and patient became more selective. 18 
Thus, the law evolved that a private physician owes no duty to treat 
all sick people. 19 Ethically and morally, a private physician is free to 
"'Id. at 610-11. 
15PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. BIOMED. 
BEHAVIORAL RES., SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES, 97-98 
(vol. I) (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT's CoMM'N]. 
16Walters, Ethical Issues in the Prevention and Treatment of HIV Infection and AIDS, 239 
SciENCE 597, 600-601 (1988). Estimates of personal medical costs for AIDS patients 
in 1991 range from $3.5 billion to $9.4 billion, and there are already shortages in 
health care facilities, home care programs and counseling services for infected per-
sons. Id. at 601. 
17Marsh, Health Care Cost Containment and the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 
159-60 (Chicago 1985). 
'"Id. at 160. 
19Davis v. Weiskopf, 108 Ill. App. 3d 505, 439 N.E.2d 60 (1982); Lyons v. Grether, 
218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103 (1977); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1969); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901). See also Berg & Hirsch, 
The Physician's Duty To Treat, 11 LEGAL AsPECTS OF MED. PRAC. 4 (1983); Annotation, 
What Constitutes Patient-Physician Relationship for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A. L.R. 4th 
132 (1982). 
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choose whom he will treat. 20 Even the Hippocratic Oath, often cited 
as mandating a duty to treat, assumes a preexisting relationship be-
tween patient and physician. 21 
Usually the physician-patient relationship arises by contract, 
either expressed or implied, with most relationships created by im-
plication.22 Where the physician previously treated a patient for an 
illness and is considered the family physician, there may be no legal 
duty to treat that patient for a new illness. 23 In fact, a physician may, 
by notice or special agreement, limit the scope of his practice, thereby 
excluding certain diseases or medical conditions from his scope of 
responsibility. 2~ Thus, a person with HIV seropositivity, ARC, or AIDS 
may have difficulty obtaining medical care from private physicians, 
even when a prior relationship exists. 
Medical students, interns, residents, or physicians employed by 
a hospital have no choice and must treat any patient assigned to 
them. 25 Physicians who work for health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs )2b or public health clinics also do not have the same right as 
'"Childs, 440 S. W.2d at 107; Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 764, 343 P.2d 118, 
123 (1959); Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 610, 617 P.2d 774, 776 (1980). See generally 
Note, Emcrgt:ncy Care: Physicirw Should Be Placed Under an Affirmative Duty to Render 
Essentiul Medical Care in Emergwcy Circumstances, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 246 (1974). 
''Agnew, 172 Cal. App. 2d at 764, 343 P.2d at 123. For example, a physician-patient 
relationship may be implied where a person has an appointment and the physician 
has examined and begun treatment. Osbourne v. Frazer, 58 Tenn. App. 15,425 S. W.2d 
768 (1968). 
22Berg & Hirsch, s11pra note 19, at 4. 
23Hurlcy, 156 Ind. at 417, 59 N.E. at 1058. However, in some cases of preexisting 
relationships, a refusal to treat by a physician may constitute abandonment. See infra 
notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
24Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744, 746 (1931) (refusal to treat injured 
man who had been drinking). For example, a number of ob/gyn specialists have 
refused to deliver babies because of rising malpractice insurance rates. See Sandroff, 
When the Obstetrician Says "No," HEALTH, Nov. 1987, at 52. See also Note, 'Claims-Made' 
Liability Insurance: Closing The Gaps With Retroactive Coverage, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 165, 174 
n.56 (1987) (citing a Philadelphia newspaper article about obstetricians and gyne-
cologists refusing to deliver babies because of high malpractice insurance rates); G.L. 
Priest, The CHrrent lllsllrallce Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1568 (1987) 
(discussing the decline in the availability of obstetrical services). 
25Volberding and Abrams, Clinical Care and Research in AIDS, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Aug. 1985, at 17 (Special Supp.). 
26The term Health Maintenance Organization is used here to ;refer to three general 
types of prepaid medical services: those that are created by independent groups; 
those organized by individual physicians (group practice); and HMOs established 
by local medical associations. All of these organizations share some common char-
acteristics: They work on a contractual basis to provide an organized health care 
delivery system to a voluntarily enrolled population. The patient/member contracts 
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private physicians to refuse to treat a person. Physicians in these cate-
gories are contractual employees who probably contracted away all or 
most of their freedom to select patients. 27 
Recently some courts have suggested that a physician-patient 
relationship may be created independent of any contract. Under the 
legal theory of undertaking, a duty to treat may arise where a physi-
cian manifestly undertakes to treat a patient. 28 Such an undertaking 
may be implied where a physician advises patients or attempts to di-
agnose a condition over the telephone. 29 However, telephone consul-
tations in the absence of other connections to the patient usually will 
no't give rise to a legal duty to treat. 30 A physician-patient relationship 
may be created when a physician accepts an appointment to see a 
patient for a specific illness, which creates a duty to perform specific 
medical services. 31 And a relationship may also be established when 
a patient is referred by one physician to a second physician for treat-
ment of a specific problem and the second physician accepts the re-
ferral. 32 
The courts are still a long way from imposing any general duty 
to treat in the absence of some close relationship between the private 
physician and the alleged patient. Nevertheless, when groups of phy-
in advance with the HMO for her health care needs. Ludlam, Health Maintenance 
Organizations HMOs: Do They Really Work? 10 FoRUM 405, 406 (1974). 
27Contractual Theories of Recovery in the HMO Provider-Subscriber Relationship: Pro-
spective Litigation for Breach of Contract, 36 BuFFALO L. REV. 119, 123 (1987) (HMO 
physicians are either direct employees or independent contractors; see, e.g., Texas 
Fires Prison Dentist Who Refused AIDS Cases, Washington Post, Aug. 25, 1987 (Health 
Section), at 5 (staff dentist in a Texas prison was dismissed for refusing to treat 
prisoners suspected of having AIDS). 
28Bianco, The Physician-Patient Relationship, 11 LEGAL AsPECTS OF MED. PRAC. 1, 2 
(1983). 
29ld. See O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) 
(held that the jury could have concluded that the physician undertook by telephone 
to diagnose the condition of the patient). 
30Buckroyd v. Burten, 237 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 1976) (associate of the treating physi-
cian consulted by telephone regarding hospitalization of patient); Oliver v. Brock, 
342 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1977) (physician consulted by treating physician over the tele-
phone). This rule may apply to consultations in general when there is no sufficient 
connection between the physician and the patient to create a duty to treat. For 
example, in Rainier v. Grossman, 31 Cal. App. 3d 539, 107 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1973), the 
court held that a medical school professor who advised the patient's physician at a 
medical staff conference owed no duty to the patient. 
31Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 633-34, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977) (patient with 
appointment to treat vaginal infection ejected from waiting room before seeing the 
physician because she would not remove her seeing eye dog). 
32Davis v. Weiskopf, 108 Ill. App. 3d 505, 512, 439 N.E.2d 60, 64-65 (1982). 
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sicians in an area agree not to treat persons with AIDS, they may be 
violating federal antitrust laws. 33 In general, a private physician cannot 
be forced under most existing laws to treat all sick persons, even those 
with life threatening illnesses. 3 ' 
Under most good samaritan laws, there is no duty to treat. 35 Good 
samaritan laws simply limit the physician's legal liability if he volun-
tarily assists someone in an emergency situation. In the one state that 
requires physicians to treat in emergency situations, a physician is 
only required to treat if he is at the scene of the accident.36 The oper-
ation of good samaritan laws suggests that state legislatures are reluc-
tant to force private physicians to treat all sick people, even when a 
patient is able to pay for medical services. Legislatures would therefore 
be even more reluctant, from a business perspective, to force private 
physicians to treat persons who are indigent. --
A few California cities have laws prohibiting discrimination 
agains persons with AIDS. These laws cover discrimination in medical 
treatment, as well as other services. 37 These AIDS-specific antidis-
33 Antitrust laws were applied to the "learned professions" in Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In National Society of Professional Engineering v. U.S., 
435 U.S. 679 (1978), the Court focused on whether the challenged practice promoted 
or suppressed competition. More recently, the Court applied antitrust laws to peer 
review of a hospital physician. Patrick v. Burget, No. 86-1145 (U.S. May 16, 1988) 
(held that stale action does not protect Oregon physicians from federal antitrust 
liability for their activities on hospital peer-review committees). However, federal 
antitrust laws do not apply to acts that have an unsubstantial effect on interstate 
commerce. Heitler, Antitrust, Restraint of Trade, and Unfair Business Practices: Impact on 
Physicians, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 443, 448-49 (Chicago 1982). Of course the conduct still 
may be covered by state antitrust laws. At least one court has ruled that antitrust 
laws may apply when a group of doctors conspired to boycott a patient who regularly 
brought malpractice suits. Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital, 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
34Sce 61 AM. }uR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §14 (1981). 
35 Sec generally Note, Good Samaritans and Liability For Medical Malpractice, 64 CoLUM 
L. REv. 1301 (1964). Note too that Massachusetts' medical licensing board requires 
physicians to render emergency treatment to anyone, anywhere. Annas, Legal Risks 
and Responsibilities of Physicians in the AIDS Epidemic, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-
May 1988, at 26, 27 (Special Supp.). 
30VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1972). Vermont alone prescribes a statutory penalty 
for consciously failing to aid. Id. at§ 519(c). See Note, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act: 
The Impact and Potwtial of the Vermont Approach, 7 VT. L. REv. 143 (1982). 
37The Los Angeles ordinance covers discrimination in medical and dental services 
as well as businesses and public accommodations. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 
160289 (Aug. 16, 1985), 3 EMPL. PRAC. GuiDE (CCH) ~ 20,950A. The San Francisco 
ordinance prohibits discrimination on the basis of AIDS and AIDS related conditions 
and includes business establishments and public accommodations. San Francisco, 
Cal., Ordinance 49985 (Dec. 20, 1985) 3 EMPL. PRAC. GuiDE (CCH) 11~ 20,950B, 
20,9595.05. 
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crimination statutes cover persons with HIV seropositivity, ARC, anc 
AIDS, as well as persons merely suspected of having AIDS. 38 Thest 
provisions are exceptional but seem to apply only to persons with HI\ 
seropositivity, ARC, or AIDS who have the ability to pay for medica 
services. There appears to be nothing in these laws to prohibit a privatt 
physician from refusing to treat a person with AIDS if that person i: 
unable to pay for the medical services rendered. To date there are nc 
recorded decisions challenging these provisions. 
Many states prohibit discrimination based on physical dis 
ability. 39 Courts and administrative agencies interpret some of thest 
laws to include persons with HIV seropositivity, AIDS, and ARC 
within the definition of physically handicapped. 40 However, in all bu 
a few states, these laws do not cover medical services. To be coverec 
under most state laws, physicians' offices would have to be considerec 
public accommodations. 41 
38Section 3801 of the San Francisco Ordinance states: "It is the policy of the Cit.) 
and County of San Francisco to eliminate discrimination based on the fact that < 
person has AIDS or any medical signs or symptoms related thereto." 3 EMPL. PRAC 
GuiDE (CCH) 1! 20,950B.Ol. Article 5.8 of the Los Angeles Ordinance is titled: Pro· 
hibition Against Discrimination Based On A Person Suffering From The Medica: 
Condition AIDS, Or Any Medical Signs or Symptoms Related Thereto, Or Any Per· 
ception That A Person Is Suffering From The Medical Condition AIDS Whether Rea: 
Or Imaginary. 3 EMPL. PRAc. GuiDE (CCH) 1)20,950A.001. 
39Most states have antidiscrimination laws which generally prohibit discrimination 
in employment, although many cover discrimination in other areas as well. See Leon· 
ard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681, 
690 (1985). 
'"Agencies in Texas, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, California and thE 
District of Columbia have announced that AIDS-based discrimination violates laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on disability. 1985 LESBIAN/GAY LAw NoTES 53 
(Dec.). The statutory language in the laws in Alaska, Maine, Montana, Maryland, 
Nebraska and New Jersey seem likely to encompass AIDS-based discrimination. 
Leonard, supra note 39, at 692. See also Shuttleworth v.· Broward Co. Office of Budget 
and Management, 54 U.S.L.W. 2330 (1985) decided on other grounds, 639 F. Supp. 654 
(D.C. Fla. 1986); Raytheon Company v. FEHC, No. 167995 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1988); 
Cronan v. New England Telephone Company, 41 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CASES 1273 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. 1986) aff'd on other grounds, 41 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CASES 1268 (D.C. Mass. 
1986); Parry, AIDS As a Handicapping Condition (pt. 2), 10 MENTAL PHYSICAL Drs-
ABILITY L. REP. 2, 3--4 (1986). 
41Many of the antidiscrimination statutes prohibit discrimination against the hand-
icapped and other classifications in public accommodations. Generally, the offices 
of private physicians and dentists are not considered public accommodations. Rice 
v. Rinaldo, 119 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951). But cf Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 
634, 259 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1977) (held that defendant's office was within the intendment 
of the state's White Cane Act defining the rights of the disabled to public accom-
modations, but did not address whether the Act covered "all physicians' offices under 
all circumstances."). Note too that the refusal to provide professional services due 
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Since the nature of the relationship between physician and pa-
tient is considered contractual and voluntary, it is unlikely that state 
legislatures or courts would characterize physicians' offices as places 
of public accommodation as a means of forcing physicians to treat all 
sick persons who can pay. Any state legislation mandating that phy-
sicians treat financially able persons with AIDS must address why the 
law should apply to AIDS but not other serious and deadly diseases. 
Legislation which forces private professionals to provide services for 
those who the professionals prefer not to treat is fraught with consti-
hltional problcms.'12 
Terminating the RelatioHship 
A private physician usually agrees to treat a patient for a specific 
illness. But as with any consensual relationship, either the physician 
to race h<1s been viewed in some states as professional misconduct. See, e.g., N.Y. 
EDuc. LAW§ 6509 (McKinney 1985). Arguably this type of provision is not analogous 
to the AIDS discrimination cases since a refusal to provide services based solely on 
race i:s not discrimination relating to type of illness. Rather the discrimination is 
based on something totally unrelated to the practice of medicine, i.e. the race of the 
patient. Perhaps some similarity might be found between the professional miscon-
duct statute and a physician who refuses to treat homosexual or bisexual males, but 
if the physician also refuses to treat any person with AIDS, there is probably little 
that can be done in the absence of a statute creating some obligation to treat. 
42Physicians fear that excessive government involvement in health care will result 
in loss of autonomy. While autonomy is a component of the right to privacy, case law 
suggests lhat the autonomy protected applies to highly personal matters like freedom 
of choice in maritaL sexual, and reproductive matters. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374 (1978); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); but cf., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (held that the Federal 
Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy). It is doubtful that physicians could successfully assert a right to privacy to 
challenge legislation which mandated a duty to treat. Even a due process argument 
that such legislation interfered with the physician's liberty of contract might not be 
successful since government merely needs to assert some legitimate governmental 
interest to support the restriction. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); U.S. 
R.R. Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). Here the legitimate governmental 
interest is protection of the public's health. The thirteenth amendment prohibition 
of involuntary servitude may be asserted, but the Court cases recognize that the 
prohibition does not apply to those duties citizens owe to the state. Butler v. Perry, 
240 U.S. 328 (1916) (public works jobs); Arver v. U.S., 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military 
draft). The Court also ruled that interfering with business activities, like labor dis-
putes, poes not violate the thirteenth amendment. International Union v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). Finally, physicians may argue that 
mandatory treatment laws violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
However, such claims would only have to satisfy a rational basis standard of review 
since they relate to economic matters. U.S. v. Carolene Products. Co., 304 U.S. 144 
(1938). 
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or the patient is free to end the relationship unilaterally or by mutual 
consent before treatment is completed. 43 Nevertheless public policy 
considerations place certain limits on the physician's right to unilat-
erally terminate the relationship. A physician probably cannot leave 
a critically ill patient unless the patient either is out of danger or is 
entrusted to the care of another competent physician. To leave a crit-
ically ill patient without making provisions for his care or without his 
consent would constitute abandonment. 44 Under this theory the phy-
sician could be legally liable for any damage resulting from the aban-
donment. 
The law seems well settled that a physician can terminate the 
relationship for any reason, provided the patient is given reasonable 
notice. 45 Even in those cases where the physician has neither provided 
adequate notice nor provided for the transfer of care for a critically ill 
patient, the physician would only be liable where any injury suffered 
by the patient was directly related to the abandonment by the physi-
cian.46 Nevertheless, at least one court ruled that failure to pay a phy-
sician's fees is not grounds for terminating the patient-physician 
relationship. 47 Thus, a physician who undertakes the treatment of a 
person with AIDS may not be legally able to terminate the relationship 
solely because of the patient's inability to pay for medical services. 
The Right to Health Care 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly issued the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. 48 Article 25 of that document 
recognized a right to medical care. 49 This document serves as a model 
or ideal goal and in no way reflects current "rights" in most countries, 
including the United States. 50 Twenty-one years later the House of 
Delegates of the American Medical Association issued a statement 
43Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955). See generally, Anno-
tation, Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R. 2d 432 (1958). 
44Norton, 92 Ga. App. at 731, 89 S.E.2d at 812 . 
. 
45Groce v. Myers, 224 N.C. 165, 29 S.E.2d 553. (1944); Capps v. Valk, 189 Kan. 287, 
369 P.2d 238 (1962); McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964). 
46Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390, 293 A.2d 253 (1972). 
47Ricks v.Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937). 
48Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS: A CoMPILATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1 (1973). 
49/d. at 2-3. 
50Beaucharnp, The Status of the Right to Health Care, 12 Soc. RESP.: Bus., L, JouR-
NALISM, MED. 47, 48 (1986). "Its [the Declaration] preamble suggests that the docu-
ment is to be read as a blueprint for future actions and declarations of rights rather 
than as an assertion of rights that persons in their native countries now possess." 
I d. 
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declaring that "it is a basic right of every citizen to have available to 
him adequate health care." 51 However, the AMA views this right as a 
societal obligation and not an obligation of individual physicians, or 
the AMA. 52 
The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no constitutional right 
to medical care. 53 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit discussed this point in Wideman v. Shallowford Com-
1/lUility Hospit11l. 5' The court noted that if a right exists at all, it must 
derive from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
which prohibits state deprivation of fundamental rights without due 
process of law. 55 However, the court asserted that while the Consti-
tution places restraints on what the government can do, it does not 
impose any specific obligations. 56 The only instance where govern-
ment has any duty to provide medical care is where a special custodial 
or other relationship exists between the individual and government. 57 
51 Jd. quoti11g American Medical Association, House of Delegates (Chicago 1969). 
52Zuger & Miles, supra note 10, at 1926. 
53Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under Medicare Prospective Payment System: One Ad-
lllillislrntivc Model for Allocating Medical Resources Under a Government Health Insurance 
Progrn111, 19 IND. L. REv. 1151, 1157 (1986). "(l]t is clear that one does not have an 
enforceable, legal 'right' to health care. The Supreme Court has ruled that the federal 
Constitution does not recognize any such 'right' to medical care. The federal Con-
stitution does protect the entitlement interest of beneficiaries in the federal and state 
Medicare and Medicaid programs, but only to the extent outlined in the enabling 
legislation for these programs." (footnotes omitted) Id. This conclusion is also sup-
ported by the holding and language in two United States Supreme Court decisions, 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (upholding a state regulation prohibiting 
funding of therapeutic abortions for indigent women): "In a sense, every denial of 
welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents 
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has never held 
that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection 
analysis." ld. at 471; and Harris v. McRae, 448. U.S. 297, 308-9 (1980) (upholding a 
government provision denying the use of public funds for necessary abortions): 
"[A)bsent an indication of contrary legislative intent by a subsequent Congress, Title 
XIX does not obligate a participating State to pay for those medical services for which 
federal reimbursement is unavailable." (footnote omitted) I d. at 309. But see Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) where Justice Thurgood Marshall 
writing for the majority referred to medical care as a "basic necessity of life." ld., at 
259; Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The Need for a New 
Heightcllcd Scrutiny, 12 AM. ). L. MED. 345 (1986) (arguing that unequal claims in 
health care should be subject to heightened scrutiny). 
51826 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 19S7). 
55ld. at 1032-33. 
56Id. at 1033 (citing Bradberry v. Pinellas County, 789 F.2d 1513, 1517 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
"Id. at 1034-35. For example, the court has held that the government has a duty to 
provide medical care to a prisoner on the grounds that denial of such care is cruel 
and unusual punishment which is prohibited by the eighth amendment. Estelle v. 
-. 
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The courts interpret this to mean that when the government acts af-
firmatively to limit an individual's freedom or impair his ability to acl 
on his own, it is constitutionally required to provide medical care. 5~ 
While there is no constitutional right to medical care, there is nc 
legal obstacle to prevent the creation of the right legislatively. In 1970, 
Senator Edward Kennedy introduced the Health Security Act. 59 Al-
though the measure was never enacted into law, it is the closest Con-
gress has come to recognizing health care as a right. The federal 
government provides some limited health insurance benefits under 
Medicare and Medicaid, but neither program can_ be considered com-
parable. to a right to medical care. 60 
The federal government has tried to expand access to medical 
care through measures like the Hill-Burton construction program, 61 
and federal income tax exemptions for charitable institutions. 62 Never-
theless, neither the federal legislature nor the courts have been willing 
to formally recognize any right to medical care. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court has also held that an involuntarily committed 
mental patient retains certain constitutional substantive liberty interests under the 
fourteenth amendment including rights "to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and 
medical care." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). A duty to provide care 
and treatment has further been imposed for custodial relationships less extreme than 
permanent incarceration or institutionalization. See, e.g., Hamm v. DeKalb County, 
774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. den jed, 106 S. Ct. 1492 (1986) (pretrial detainment) 
and City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983) (persons 
injured while being apprehended by police). 
5
'The Court stated that a duty will arise if the government "places [the] person in 
a worse situation than he would have been had the government not acted at all. Such 
a situation could arise by virtue of the state affirmatively placing an individual in a 
position of danger, effectively stripping a person of her ability to defend herself, or 
cutting off potential sources of private aid." Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1035. 
59Kennedy, Introduction of the Health Security Act, 116 CoN G. REC. 30142 (1970). 
60Medicare covers some of the health costs for older persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 
1395-1396(d) (1982) (recipients under Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled). 
Medicaid covers some health costs for indigent persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383, 
1396-1396(p) (1982) (recipients under Aid to Families with Dependent Children and 
Supplemental Security Income Programs). 
6142 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). Under this program hospitals receiving federal monies to 
construct facilities must provide "a reasonable volume of services to persons unable 
to pay .... " 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (1982). But the President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research noted 
that "the Hill-Burton program illustrate[s] the reluctance of government to place 
significant constraints on providers' freedom of action, even where large sums of 
public money are involved .... Although the Hill-Burton Act was designed to get 
hospital beds to places with the greatest need, it did not provide the means to force 
the issue." PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N, supra note 15, at 128. 
6226 U.S. C.§ 501(c)(3) (1982). 
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At lht: state level one state trial court ruled that a right to certain 
health care is guaranteed by that state's constitution. 63 Three states-
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Minnesota-enacted comprehensive health 
insurance statutes in the 1970s. M Recently, Massachusetts became the 
first state to mandate universal health insurance for all state resi-
dents. 65 Nevertheless, this legislation does not create any duty of phy-
sicians to treat all persons who are sick. 
Ethical Duty to Treat 
There is a difference between law and ethics. Law sets forth the 
minimal standards of performance required by society whereas ethics 
set forth the ideal standards of performance, "the best performance 
the individual can, by virtue of training and natural endowment, de-
Jiver."66 NeveTtheless, law and medical ethics reinforce each otheT in 
that the law protects patients from unethical physicians while ethics 
insure that physicians will carry out those obligations not mandated 
by law. 67 
Medical practice laws date back to the Code of Hammurabi (1792-
1750 B.C.)/'8 but the Hippocratic Oath, developed around 400 B.C., 
represents the first attempt to develop a code of medical ethics. 69 In 
the early nineteenth century, Thomas Percivat a British physician, 
modernized Greek medical ethics70 and his version was adopted by 
the Medical Society of Boston in 1808.71 The American Medical As-
63Kinney, S!tpra note 53, at 1157, citing Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11,1979, at 
10, col. 5 (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. 1979), and Malone, Homelessness in Modem l.Jrban Setting, 
10 FoRDHAM URJJ. L. J. 749, 769 (1982). Article I of the New Jersey constitution was 
used to support a right to a publicly funded abortion. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 
N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979); new regulations reviewed 
i11 169 N.J. Super. 543, 405 A.2d 427 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979), modified on other 
gnlLOids, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). These cases suggest that state constitutions 
could be used to create a right to health care. See geuerally The Emergence of State 
CoHstitutiol!lll Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 959-1338 (1986). 
""Connecticut Health Care Act of 1975, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 38-371 to-381 
(West 1987 & Supp. 1988); Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-
1 to -51 (1985); Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1976, as amended, 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 62E.Ol-612E.18 (West1986 & Supp. 1988). 
65Radding and Carlsen, Mass. Lawmakers Approve Universal Health Coverage, HEALTH 
WEEK, April25, 1988, at 25. 
1
"'C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW AND ETHICS 2 (1984). 
"'Pellegrino, Hospitals as Moral Agents, in MEDICAL ETHICS: A CLINICAL TEXTBOOK 
AND REFERENCE FOR THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONS 195 (N. Abrams & M.D. Buckner 
eds. 1983). [hereinafter Abrams & Buckner]. 
""C. CHAPMAN, supm note 66, at 4. 
69/d. at 20. 
70See id. at 77-86. 
71Id. at 86. 
·, 
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sociation (AMA) formed and adopted a code of ethics in 1847.72 Thi~ 
code, the Principles of Medical Ethics, was revised in 1903, 1912, 1957, 
and 1980.73 Nevertheless, the AMA represents only 50% of the nation'~ 
physicians. 74 As one commentator wrote: "We live in a democratic 
society in which there is no uniformity of opinion on most media-
moral issues and no recognized authority to settle differences in eth-
ical beliefs. 1175 
A code of ethics does not necessarily constitute a clear mandate 
of public policy76 and the breach of medical ethics is not enforceable 
in a court of law. 77 The primary focus of traditional medical ethics is 
the duty the physician owes to the medical profession. 78 The duty 
owed to the patient is largely determined by the physician. 79 Breach 
of a voluntary association's ethical standards carries no formal sanc-
tions other than loss of membership in the association. 80 But state 
medical boards control the licensing of physicians and breach of their 
standards can result in loss or revocation of one's license_ 81 Further, 
courts often use ethical standards as proof of the requisite duty of care 
since a physician's legal duty is often determined by the prevailing 
medical custom. 82 
Until the AMA amended the canons of ethics in November, 1987, 
the only instance under the modern code in which a physician had an 
ethical duty to treat was an emergency. Section Six of the 1980 Principles 
of Medical Ethics states: "A physician shall, in the provision of appro-
priate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to 
serve, with whom to associate and the environment in which to pro-
vide medical services. 1183 Although the first AMA code in 1847 pro-
72ld. at llL 
73ld. at 112-24. 
74Arras, The Fragile Web of Responsibility: AIDS and the Duty to Treat, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 10, 20 n.38 (Special Supp.). 
75Abrams and Buckner, supra note 67, at 197. 
76Warthen v. Toms River Comm. Memorial Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229, 
cert. denied, 101 N.J. 255, 501 A.2d 926 (1985) (held that the nurses' code of ethics did 
not represent a clear mandate of public policy so as to override an employer's policy 
to the contrary). For further discussion of this principle, see Davis, Defining the Em-
ployment Rights of Medical Personnel Within the Parameters of Personal Conscience, 3 DE-
TROIT CoLL. L. REv. 847 (1986). · 
77Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 657, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251 (1965) cited with 
approval in Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 114 (Okla. 1988). 
78C. CHAPMAN, supra note 66, at 88-89. 
79Jd. 
80Annas, supra note 35, at 29. 
BIJd. at 30-
82Jd. at 29. 
83PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS §VI (American Medical Association 1980), quoted 
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vided that a physician's ethical duty during epidemics was to 
"continue his labors without regard to the risk to his own health," 84 
this provision is not part of the present code. 
The AMA's first statement on AIDS did not impose any obliga-
tion to treat HlV-infected people. While recognizing the profession's 
long tradition of treating patients with contagious diseases, the AMA 
asserted that where the physician is "emotionally" unable to care for 
HIV infected patients other arrangements should be made. 85 The 1987 
amendment does not explicitly revoke this earlier statement and, as 
one commentator noted, it actually" subsumes ... the prior exemption 
for 'emotional inability'."86 In general, though, the amendment im-
plies an obligation to treat HIV-infectious patients. 87 
The prestige of the medical profession is due in part to the pub-
lic's perception that physicians are willing to endanger themselves to 
fulfill their obligations to persons who are sick. 88 However, at least 
one commentator suggests that this notion is no longer part of medical 
ethics. 89 There have been radical changes in medical ethics over the 
last twenty years. 90 Some of these changes, especially the entry of 
in llllethicnl to nefusc to Treat HIV-illfectcd Patic11t AMA says, Amer. Med. News, Nov. 
20, 1987, at 1, col. 1. 
"'AIDS REPORT, reprinted iH Freedman, s11pra note 6, at 24. 
"'The 1986 statement read: 
Physicians and other health professionals have a long tradition of tend-
ing to patients afflicted with infectious disease with compassion and 
courage. However, not everyone is emotionally able to care for patients 
with AIDS. If the health professional is unable to care for a patient with 
AIDS, that individual should ask to be removed from the case. Alter-
native arrangements for the care of the patient must be made. 
A.M.A. CouNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JuDICIAL AFFAIRS, STATEMENT ON AIDS (Dec. 
1986), reprinted in Freedman, supra note 6, at 22. 
"''Freedman, supra note 6, at 24. The amendment refers to the physician's obligation 
to treat a condition within his "realm of competence" and states that he should "re-
spond to the best of [his] abilities in cases of emergency .... "It also states that "[a] 
physician who is not able to provide the services required by persons with AIDS 
should make an appropriate referral to those physicians or facilities that are equipped 
to provide such services." Id., quoting AIDS Report, supra, note 6. The author notes 
that emotional incapacity may be one source of inability. Id. 
87Id. 
""Jonscn, Ethics awl AIDS, 70 BuLL. AMER. C. SuRGEONS, June 1985 at 16, 17. 
s•Jd. )onse11 suggests that the idea of physicians' willingness to endanger their lives 
to help those who are sick is being revived in light of the AIDS epidemic. Id. 
""Two radical changes are: (1) the shift to more patient autonomy in health care 
decisionmaking; and (2) the tremendous expansion of medical technological capa-
bility. Pellegrino & Thomasma, The Conflict Between Alllonomy and Beneficence in Med-
ical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. PoLICY 23 (1987). 
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economic considerations as a primary force in health care decisions, 
create conflicts with the traditional canons of ethics. 91 
Several models have been used to describe the ethical obligation 
physicians owe patients. 92 The prevailing view of this obligation is best 
represented by the contractual model. Under this model physician and 
patient are bound by a voluntary agreement governing the patient's 
care. 93 Absent this agreement there is no duty to treat. 9" While this 
model has come under attack, 95 even those who accept it consider the 
physician-patient relationship as a social or fiduciary contract. 96 
Abigail Zuger and Steven H. Miles, writing for the Center for 
Clinical Medical Ethics at The University of Chicago Hospitals and 
Clinics, assert that "an ethic stressing traditional professional duties 
may not be ideal for defining the optimal relation of the medical profes-
sions to patients with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. A new 
professional ethic to guide physicians in the [AIDS] pandemic is 
needed."97 They point out that neither the rights nor contract ethical 
models of medical care require physicians to treat persons with HIV 
seropositivity, ARC, and AIDS. 98 They argue that the virtuous physi-
cian or a virtue-based ethical model of medical care is the only model 
that mandates a clear ethical duty to treat.99 
The notion of the virtuous physician was popular in the United 
States and Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 100 Sam-
91ld. See also Emanuel, Do Physicians Have an Obligation to Treat Patients With AIDS?, 
318 NEW ENG.]. MED. 1686 (1988). 
91SC>me of the ethical models are: (1) the priestly model in which the patient is 
obligated to do whatever the physician recommends; (2) the engineering model in 
which the physician is viewed as a technical expert; and (3) the collegial model in 
which physician and patient are viewed as equals in all respects. Brody, The Physician-
Patient Contract: Legal and Ethical Aspects, J. LEGAL MED., July-Aug. 1976, at 25, 26. 
There is also the rights model in which "a patient's right to health care creates a 
correlative duty on the part of physicians, institutions, or society to provide health 
care." Zuger & Miles, supra note 10, at 1927. 
93Zuger & Miles, supra note 10, at 1927. 
"'I d. 
95See, e.g., Masters, Is Contract An Adequate Basis For Medical Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER · 
REP., Dec. 1975, at24; May, Code, Covenant, Contract, or Philanthropy, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Dec. 1975, at 29. 
96Brody, supra note 92, at 26-27. See also Veatch, Models For Ethical Medicine Ii1 A 
Revolutionary Age, HASTINGS CENTER REP., incomplete cite 1972, at 5. 
"Zuger & Miles, supra note 10, at 1924. 
9
"Id. The rights model imposes an obligation on the profession, not on individual 
physicians. Thus, except in emergencies, an individual physician has no ethical duty 
to treat under this model. Id. at 1927. 
99ld. at 1927-28. 
100McCullough, ]11stice and Health Care: Historical Perspectives and Precedents, in Jus-
TICE AND HEALTH CARE 51, 60 (E. E. Shelp ed. 1981). James Gregory in Scotland and 
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uel Bard, one of the founders of Kings College medical school in New 
York City, contended that the virtuous physician has an obligation to 
treat sick indigent persons without charge. 101 Bard said that a refusal 
to treat them without remuneration would be contrary to benevo-
lcnce.102 
Bard's virtuous physician owed a duty not only to his patients, 
but to the public at large. 103 He owed these duties not because of any 
basic right of the individual to health care or because of any duty owed 
government to protect the public health. Rather the virtuous physician 
should treat sick indigent persons without charge because this duty 
is freely taken on and defines him as a physician. 104 Since some would 
contend that many of today's practitioners no longer believe this and 
are more concerned about economic considerations, Zuger and Miles' 
ethical model seems unrealistic. 
The ideals underlying the concept of the medical police seems 
more consistent with the historic position of physicians during the 
plagues. The medical police concept was developed by the Germans 
in the eighteenthcentury. 105 According to this concept, government 
needs to regulate medical education and practice to prevent quacks 
and charlatans and to insure a large, sturdy, healthy population. 106 
Physicians are considered medical police because their primary obli-
gation is to insure that society remains healthy-that is, they are to 
police the public's health. This obligation is owed to government and 
not to the patient. 107 
ln reviewing the history of the medical profession's response to 
contagious diseases, Daniel Fox, a professor of humanities in medi-
cine, has concluded that "there has been remarkable continuity in how 
the profession has responded to the threat of contagion."108 Fox notes 
that plague doctors usually negotiated with civic leaders to treat the 
sick, often in exchange for money and prestige. 109 Thus, the obligation 
Samuel Bard in the United States were the two leading proponents of this theory. ld. 
at 61. 
""Id. at 63-64. 
""Id. at 64. 
W3Jd. 
HI'Jd. at 61-64. 
lll-'Jd. at 58. 
"'''ld., citi11g G. RosEN, FROM MEDICAL PoLICE TO SociAL MEDICINE: EssAYS ON THE_ 
HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE (1974). Rosen credits this concept to Wolfgang T. Raw who 
first coined the term medical police. Id. 
107ld. at 59. 
10
''Fox, The Politics of Physicians' Responsibility in Epidemics: A Note oH History, HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 5 (Special Supp.). 
"'"Id. at 9. · 
AIDS and the Right to Health Care 
to treat in times of epidemics was still based in contract, except tha 
the contract was between the physician and society and not the pa· 
tient. 
Another commentator has asserted that the ethical obligation tc 
treat arises either by virtue of the social contract or reciprocity result-
ing from the physician's monopolistic privilege to practice medicine. 1H 
Even though thfs obligation is imposed on the medical profession col-
lectively, it can and should be imposed on·the individual physician. 111 
An editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association ar-
gues that the virtue-based ethical model of health care is not sufficient 
to address the problem of refusals to treat patients with AIDS. 112 The 
author asserted that "an obligation of effacement of self-interest" is 
imposed by three things which distinguish medicine from other busi-
nesses: the nature of the illness itself; the fact that a physician's knowl-
edge about medical matters is not proprietary; and the physician's 
covenantthatis publicly acknowledged upon graduation. 113 Mostmed-
ical students and many physicians disagree with the author's premise 
that altruism is obligatory. 114 Even if they agreed, existence of an ethical 
obligation to treat does not necessarily translate into access to health 
care since breaches of ethics are rarely punished. 115 Thus, medical 
ethics provide little help for people with AIDS who are seeking ade-
quate health care unless courts are willing to convert these ethical 
principles into law. Nevertheless, the ethical issues raised by AIDS 
concerning the duty to treat are important not only for those HIV-
infected persons but for future generations faced with different, but 
no less alarming, epidemics. 116 
Right to Health Care Revisited 
In 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research asserted 
that "[a] sufficient supply of health personnel and facilities does not 
ensure that health care resources are available to all members of a 
11
"Arras, supra note 74, at 11. 
111 ld. at 11-12. 
mpeJlegrino, supra note 1. 
113Jd. 
11
'Arras, supra note 74, at 18-19. 
mTwo medical licensing boards have adopted two different approaches to physi-
cians' refusals to treat HIV-infected persons. New Jersey prohibits such conduct and 
Arizona allows it. Annas, supra note 35, at 30. 
n60ne author has written: "If and when such future epidemics strike, and such 
diseases turn out not to be respectors of race and social class, what kind of medical 
profession will the public want then?" Arras, supra note 74, at 19. 
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community." 117 The Commission found that there was such a high 
demand for physicians in the United States that physicians could be 
selective in accepting patients.m Experience shows that we cannot 
always rely on individual physicians to make fair and just choices. For 
example, the Commission pointed out that racial and ethnic minorities 
in this country still have limited access to health care because of dis-
criminatory practices. 119 The Commission also found that many phy-
sicians feel no responsibility to treat indigent persons. 120 Since many 
AIDS patients are among the indigent as well as various racial and 
ethnic minorities, and generally have little or no health insurance, 
their access to adequate health care is a concern. 121 
Some physicians assert that medical care is neither a right nor a 
privilege, but simply a service provided by physicians to people who 
wish to purchase it. 122 They say that nothing in the Hippocratic Oath 
suggests that physicians should treat indigent persons without 
charge. 123 
The key issue here is whether a right to health care should be 
legislated to insure that the sick have access to adequate health care, 
regardless of their ability to pay. Members of the medical community 
contend that a right to health care would seriously threaten physician 
autonomy. 124 Proponents of a legislative right to health care argue that 
creation of a general right might lower the overall health of the pop-
ulation.125 Among the proponents, Robert M. Veatch, a noted medical 
117 PRESIDENT's CoMM'N, supra note 15, at 85. 
11
"/d. at 88. 
119/d. at 89, citillg INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE IN A CONTEXT OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS 35 (1981). . 
120]d. For more recent confirmation, see Lundberg & Bodine, Fifty Hours for the Poor, 
258 JAMA 3157 (1987) and Hilfiker, "Unconscious 011 a corner, .... " 258 JAMA 3155 
(1987). These authors suggest that physicians should donate a portion of their prac-
tice to the poor. In reply, one writer objected: "Let me tell you, buddy, I don't do 
anything in this business without financial remuneration .... They're (the poor) 
drunks, addicts, illiterates, beggers [sic], and thieves. They're unemployed simply 
because they're unemployable. They procreate prolifically and illegitimately, sad-
dling future generations of responsible citizens with more of their kind." Letters, 
259 JAMA 2236-37 (1988). 
m See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
122Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1288, 1289 (1971). 
123Letter from E. Reinhardt to Dr. Arnold S. Reiman, Institute of Medicine, Nat'l 
Academy of Science, FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 210, 211, 213 (1986) 
reprinted in HEALTH LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (Furrow, Johnson, Jost, Schwartz 
eds. 1987). 
124 See generally Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 90. 
125 See, e.g., Veatch, Ethical Aspects of the Right to Health Care in MEDICAL ETHICS AND 
HiE LAw: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 53, 55 (Hiller ed. 1981). 
-. 
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ethicist, contends that a legislated right to health cannot be delivered, 
but that a right to access to certain kinds of health care should be 
legislated. 126 Justice, he argues, must be a conscious goal of our health 
policy planning and a legislated right to health care short of a blank 
check for "every imaginable kind of desired medical intervention at 
government expense" is only fair. 127 
A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine noted that 
the number of uninsured Americans increased from 26 to 35 million 
between 1977 and 1984. 128 Most of the uninsured are poor and ap-
proximately 23 million are children and their young parents, 129 the 
same group that is at a high risk for heterosexual transmission of HIV. 
The article noted that lack of insurance means lack of access to health 
care and results in increased financial burdens for society as a whole. 130 
A few states are trying to increase access to health care by pres-
suring private nonprofit hospitals to carry a larger percentage of char-
ity cases. Although publicly supported hospitals traditionally had no 
duty to accept and treat everyone, 131 today few public hospitals would 
risk refusing to treat persons infected with HIV. However, private 
hospitals, as a general rule, are under no legal obligation to admit and 
treat all who need medical care. 132 Even the receipt of federal funds 
does not substantially alter the legal obligation of private hospitals in 
selecting patients.133 The only possible exception to this rule is where 
the private hospital maintains an emergency room. In this case the 
hospital must provide emergency treatmene34 but is under no obliga-
tion to treat the patient further and may refuse comprehensive treat-
ment without liability. 135 
Recently, private nonprofit hospitals have come under attack for 
not providing sufficient charity care to warrant a tax exemption. The 
11
'Id. at 54. 
mid. at 71-72. 
128Freedman, Klepper, Duncan & Bell, Coverage of the Uninsured and Underinsured: 
A Proposal for School Enrollment Based Family Health Insurance, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 
843, 844 (1988). 
129ld. at 845. 
13J.lld. at 844. 
mwilliams v. Hospital Authority of Hall County, 119 Ga. App. 626, 627, 168 S.E.2d 
336, 337 (1969). 
132Le Juene Road Hospital v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Fabian 
v. Matzko, 236 Super. 267, 344 A.2d 569 (1975). See generally Annotation, Liability of 
Hospital for Refusal to Admit or Treat Patient, 35 A. L.R. 3d 841 (1971). 
133Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hos-
pital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). 
134Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 25, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (1961). 
135Harper v. Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, 341 So.2d 133 (Ala. 1976). 
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issue is whether the hospitals arc providing the services for which the 
charitable tax exemption is intended. 
Tax exemptions are a form of subsidy, similar to cash grants in 
the amount of taxes the organization would otherwise have 
paid. Like deductions and other special exclusions, they con-
stitute the tax expenditure budget. Tax expenditure budget 
items, as opposed to direct budget outlays, represent the reve-
nue losses attributable to provisions of the federal income tax 
laws that are intended to encourage certain economic activities, 
such as support of charitable institutions. 136 
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a Utah county's chal-
lenge to the state tax commission grant of a tax exemption to two 
private nonprofit hospitals. 137 The county questioned whether the hos-
pital provided sufficient charity care and community service to justify 
the state tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals. 138 The state supreme 
court held that the hospital has the burden of proving annually that 
they are engaged in sufficient charitable activities. 139 
The court set forth six factors to be considered in determining 
whether a hospital is used for charitable purposes. These factors are: 
(1) whether the hospital's stated purpose is to provide significant med-
ical care without expectation of material reward; (2) whether patients 
are required to pay in whole or part for services rendered by the hos-
pital; (3) whether the beneficiaries of the charities are restricted or 
unrestricted; (4) whether the hospital is supported by donations and 
gifts; (5) whether accumulated capital results in a profit in the sense 
that income from gifts, donations and payment from recipients of the 
charity exceeds operating and maintenance costs; and (6) whether 
some form of financial benefit such as dividends is available to private 
interests, and whether commercial activities are subordinate to char-
itable activities. 140 
While the Utah decision remains a minority view, several other 
states-California, Vermont, and Tennessee-are considering or al-
ready implementing similar policies. 141 One congressional committee 
is examining certain operational aspects of these private nonprofit 
136Dcvclop111CiliS Regarding the Charitable Tax Exemptio11 for Hospitals, 19 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 472, 473 (1985) [hereinafter Dcvelopmel!fs]. 
137Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). 
IJBJJ!. at 274. 
139ld. at 273. 
""Id. at 269-70. 
'"Tolchin, Hospitals Use Charity to Fend Off Tax Collectors, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1988, 
at C3, col. 1 (Science Section). 
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hospitals. 142 Even the current medical literature has addressed this 
issue. 143 Many reasons are given for a closer examination of the char-
itable activities of these private hospitals, lH but without a doubt, a 
major reason is the growing concern about the 37 million medically 
indigent people denied access to health care because they do not qual--
ify for Medicaid or private health insurance plans. 145 
This attack on private nonprofit hospitals is not new. In Simon v. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, low-income plaintiffs un-
successfully challenged a change in the charitable obligation of fed-
erally tax-exempt hospitals. 146 The United States Supreme Court 
avoided the issue by ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 147 
The Utah decision questioning a hospital's right to tax exemp-
tions should not seem surprising. Many hospitals are granted tax-
exemptions by federal and state internal revenue services148 based on 
the prerequisite that these hospitals are to be operated for charitable 
purposes. 149 "The term 'charitable' traditionally has b-een tied to the 
provision of free care to poor uninsured persons who are unable to 
pay for necessary medical care."150 However, there is still much con-
fusion at the federal level over the meaning of the term "charitable" 
as used in Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), 151 and federal 
courts are reluctant to entertain suits raising the issue. 152 Thus, the 
focus has shifted to the states. 
'"I d. 
143Relman, Are Voluntary Hospitals Caring for the Poor?, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1198 
(1988); Lewin & Eckels, Setting The Record Straight: The Provision of Uncompensated Care 
by Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 318 NEw ENG.]. MED. 1212 (1988). 
144These include the perception that hospitals have become businesses and should 
be treated as such, the need for revenue in states and cities, and complaints from 
small businesses concerned with competition from nonprofit hospitals engaged in 
commercial activities. Tolchin, supra note 141. 
145Jd. 
146Jd.426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
147Jd. 
''"Developments, supra note 136, at 472, citing Schwartz & Rose, Opening the Doors of 
the Non-Profit Hospital to the Poor, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 655 (1974). 
149ld., citing 26 U.S. C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. 1984). Under§ 50l(c)(3), a hospital must 
also use no part of its net earnings to benefit any private individual or shareholder 
and it must refrain from substantial lobbying or political activities. Id. at 473. 
150Id., citing Rose, The Implications of the Charitable Deduction and Exemption Provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code Upon the Service Required of a Voluntary Hospital to Treat the 
Poor, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 183 (1970); Bromburg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 24 (1970). 
151 See generally Developmwts, supra note 136, 473-76. 
152See, e.g., Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd sub. nom., Lugo 
v. Miller, 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs denied standing even though they 
had sued specific tax-exempt hospitals as well as Treasury officials). Compare Simon 
1 ...,7 ;_ Issw:s in Lrw & Medicine, Volume 4, Number 2, 1988 
A number of state bws require that charitable, tax-exempt insti-
tutions provide free care to persons who are indigent. 153 Alabama and 
Mississippi specifically refer to the obligation of tax exempt hospitals 
to provide free medical care to persons who are indigent. 154 Other 
states prohibit tax-exempt hospitals from discriminating in their ad-
missions policies, 155 and still "[ o ]ther states interpret their tax laws to 
confer charitable exemption upon facilities that are caring for those 
who would otherwise become government charges. " 156 
Legal scholars and others have questioned the casual conferral 
of nonprofit tax-exempt status on private hospitals and other nonprofit 
organizations. 157 lt is surprising that legal services lawyers and others 
who traditionally represent persons who are indigent have not chal-
lenged state tax commissions for not requiring private nonprofit hos-
pitals to provide a significant percentage of free care or provide other 
comparable charitable services. 158 
Imposing a duty to treat on hospitals, both public and private, 
seems consistent with the medical police theory of health care with 
the hospital substituted for the individual physician. One could argue 
that in light of the tremendous advances in medical science since the 
eighteenth century, hospitals rather than individual physicians are the 
more appropriate health caretakers for the public. 
Since tax exemptions are public subsidies, as are tax deductions 
given to donors to nonprofit hospitals, it is not unreasonable in light 
of the large number of people denied access to health care to require 
the private sector to carry a portion of the load. The predicted increase 
v. Ens tern Kentllcky Welfare Rights Organizatioll, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (plaintiffs denied 
standing because no specific hospital was named as defendant). 
153See, e.g., Burgess v. Four States Memorial Hospital, 250 Ark. 485, 465 S.W.2d 693 
(1971); United Presbyterian Association~'· Board of County Commissioners, 167 Colo. 
485, 448 P.2d 967 (1968); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, 173 So.2d 176 
(Fla. 1965); Georgia Osteopathic Hospital v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962); 
Iowa Methodist Hospital v. Board of Re~iew, 252 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1977); Ruston 
Hospital v. Riser, 191 So.2d 665 (La. 1966). 
15-lALA. CoDE 40-9-1(2) (Supp. 1987); Mrss. CoDE ANN.§ 27-31-1(f) (Supp. 1987). 
155ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, ,1500.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
68, § 2405(j) (West Supp. 1988); TENN. ConE ANN. § 67-5-212(e)(2) (Supp. 1987); see 
abo Developlllents, supra note 136, at 478. 
15
"Dcvelop11Ients, supra note 136, at 477. 
157ld. See also Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1416 (1980); Hopkins & Beckwith, The Federal Tax Law of Hospitals; Basic Principles 
and Current Developments, 24 DuQUESNE L. REv. 691 (1985). 
158But cf Cook v. Rose, 299 S.E. 2d 3 (W.Va. 1982) (held that, pursuant to the state's 
"charitable purpose" requirement, guidelines for determining tax-exempt status had 
to require tax-exempt hospitals to provide free and below-cost services to patients 
unable to pay). ld. at 8. See also Developme!lts, supra note 136, at 477. 
-. 
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in the number of indigent AIDS-related cases may force more state 
to require greater accountability of private nonprofit hospitals. 
Nevertheless, this approach to increasing indigent persons' ac 
cess to health care does not prevent these hospitals from denyin1 
treatment to HIV -infected persons who can pay Such a denial may h 
barred by federal and state handicap antidiscrimination laws prohib 
iting discrimination on the basis of disability Further, if the charit: 
burden becomes too· great, private nonprofit hospitals may decide h 
become for-profit hospitals in an attempt to avoid this burden. 159 If thi: 
tactic becomes commonplace, states may end up with decreased rathe 
thari increased access to health care. 
Conclusion 
The AIDS crisis may force society to rethink the issue of a righ 
to health care. Should such a right be recognized and on whom shoulc 
a duty to treat be imposed? Shifting the focus of the duty from indi 
vidual physicians to public or private hospitals may result in greate: 
access to health care for all. Forcing private hospitals to shoulder somt 
of the burden of care for the indigent and other groups traditionall] 
denied adequate care will expand access to medical care even more 
However, a recognized right to medical care should not be anticipated 
Not only is there no constitutional right to health care, but attemph 
at regulating such a right have not been successful. Furthermore, de 
spite pressure on private nonprofit hospitals to provide an adequatE 
amount of charity care to warrant their tax exempt status, the enforce· 
ment of tax-exempt requirements at the state level will not result ir 
the recognition of a right to health care. At best, a piecemeal approad 
to solving the health care crisis is likely, particularly in view of thE 
medical community's negative attitude toward government sponsorec 
health care. With no end in sight to the AIDS crisis, such an approact 
is unfortunate. 
'
59See Lewin & Eckels, supra note 143. The authors contend there is little differencE 
between the amount of charity care provided by private nonprofit and private for· 
profit hospitals. They cite a recent study showing substantial differemces in the 
amount of such care provided at state and local levels where not-for-profit and inves-
tor-owned hospitals are in cornpetitio-~. Id. at 1213. 
